UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/565
18 July 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Despite the explicit demands of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, international law, numerous international conferences and, indeed, the Security Council, neither the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) nor the Republika Srpska have honoured their obligations and commitments with respect to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This failure to heed demands, to honour commitments and to respect international humanitarian law, has been reported to and noted by the Council on several previous occasions. The latest letter from the President of the Tribunal, the Honourable Judge Antonio Cassese, dated 11 July 1996 (circulated as Security Council document S/1996/556), once again confirms that the Tribunal's orders are not being obeyed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republika Srpska, an entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. President Cassese, therefore, asks the Security Council to take the necessary steps as envisioned by the Dayton Agreement and the Council itself in establishing the Tribunal - that includes imposing sanctions with respect to the non-compliant.

We have come to the end of the line. No more excuses or delays can be legitimately accepted. Failure to take the necessary measures for the prompt arrest and extradition of war criminals and failure to apply sanctions for non-compliance can only be understood as a lack of respect for the equality of the lives of Bosnian victims, and as a marginalization of international law as well as the Security Council and the institutions it has established. Would the Powers behind the Implementation Force (IFOR) or the permanent members of the Council respond in the same fashion if crimes against their citizens were involved? Clearly, precedent shows otherwise.

The peace process as well as the Tribunal's future are very much at issue, both imperilled by inaction on the ground and delay in the Council. The Council should know its obligations towards the Tribunal as well as to the international community without my assistance. I will take the opportunity to refresh your memory regarding the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement (see A/50/790-S/1995/999, attachment) which, in annex 4, article II, paragraph 8, reads, "All competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall cooperate with ... the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (and in particular shall comply with orders issued pursuant to Article 29 of the Statute of the Tribunal".

We support efforts to remove indicted war criminals from public and political office as is also demanded by annex 4, article IX, paragraph 1, of the Dayton/Paris Agreement, in order to promote a more democratic electoral process. The latter, however, is explicitly not a substitute for arrest and extradition.

Therefore, we strongly request that within the Council there be no attempts to invoke further excuses and delays and to confuse demands for arrest and extradition with the attempts, so far unsuccessful, to remove indicted war criminals from positions of authority. Regardless of the success or failure of Ambassador Frowick's or Ambassador Holbrooke's efforts to remove them from positions of authority, the Council must move to compel the arrest and extradition of indicted war criminals.

I have just returned from Bosnia and Herzegovina to address the Council members, and my message is simple. On the ground, justice, reconciliation, your credibility and peace are in grave danger. You must act decisively now. We strongly recommend that you encourage IFOR to take the necessary measures and, if necessary, to reconfirm IFOR's mandate. Moreover, we strongly recommend to reimpose sanctions on the non-compliant.

Excellency, may I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Special Envoy

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/566
18 July 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Lebanon has decided to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires on 31 July 1996, for a further interim period of six months, on the basis of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and all other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

The Government of Lebanon is pleased to report that the national reconstruction and rehabilitation process is proceeding. Efforts to rebuild a new commercial centre in downtown Beirut and to modernize the national infrastructure are ongoing. Priority has been given to basic services such as electricity, telecommunications, transportation, water works, schools and hospitals.

My Government is also pleased to report that the command of UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities continue to coordinate in perfect harmony with the goal of deploying the Lebanese Army throughout the southern part of the country up to its internationally recognized boundaries.

Despite the satisfactory economic performance and the progress and acceleration of reconstruction, Israel's continuous occupation of south Lebanon and its continued aggression against Lebanon and its citizens remain the major obstacle to comprehensive national recovery. The Israeli Army continues to shell villages and towns in Lebanon using fragmentation and nail bombs which are prohibited by international conventions.

It is most regrettable that Israel, despite its participation in the ongoing Middle East peace process launched in Madrid in October 1991, continues to attack Lebanon by land, sea and air.

Furthermore, Israel still refuses to release hundreds of innocent Lebanese detainees held for years in Israeli jails and the notorious detention camps in Al-Khiam and Marjayoun in south Lebanon, manned by the Israelis in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Many of the detainees are suffering from serious

diseases as a result of harsh living conditions, subjection to ill-treatment, and denial of medical care. Others have died in the camps or shortly after being released. The detainees have been subjected to physical and mental torture in further violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Lebanon remains wholly committed to the Middle East peace process in order to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978). Lebanon agreed to participate in the Peace Conference on the Middle East at Madrid and subsequent rounds of negotiations at Washington on the basis of resolution 425 (1978), as was confirmed by the letter of assurances dated 18 October 1991 from the Government of the United States of America, as co-sponsor of the Conference, to the Government of Lebanon. It was Lebanon's clear understanding that the Middle East peace process would provide the framework in which Israel would implement Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

In fact, Israeli forces launched repeated attacks against Lebanon, the most violent of which was the grave escalation of April 1996, provoking in its wake numerous innocent casualties, large-scale exodus of civilians and massive destruction of the Lebanese infrastructure.

In view of Israel's continued aggressions against Lebanon and their threat to the peace process, it must be underscored that the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) remains the only way to stop the violence in southern Lebanon. Towards this end, the Council could play a positive role in securing peace for the region by demonstrating the inviolability of its resolutions and undertaking long overdue measures to implement resolution 425 (1978). This would enable the Government of Lebanon to re-establish law and order throughout the entire south of the country by extending its authority up to its internationally recognized boundaries.

The Government of Lebanon considers that the operational strength and capacity of UNIFIL should be maintained, with a view to implementing resolution 425 (1978) fully. In this context, UNIFIL represents the international community's commitment to Lebanon and to the restoration of its full sovereignty and territorial integrity. Its support and humanitarian assistance are vital to the civilian population, but cannot be a substitute for the fulfilment of its original mandate as stipulated in resolution 425 (1978). UNIFIL's role as an interim force is to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and to assist the Government of Lebanon in re-establishing its legitimate and effective authority in the area, through its army and internal security forces.

The Government of Lebanon avails itself of this opportunity to pay tribute to the UNIFIL command, administrators, troops and troop-contributing countries for their noble efforts and sacrifices made in the cause of peace. It expresses deep appreciation to the Secretary-General and his assistants for their tireless efforts, which contribute to the valuable presence of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/50/1000
S/1996/567
18 July 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 44
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 18 July 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning Israel's repeated attacks on southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa and the arbitrary practices against the local inhabitants in which it engages on a daily basis, I have the honour to notify you of the series of such incidents that took place in the second half of June 1996.

16 June 1996

Ali Abdu Diya, a journalist residing in the town of Khiyam, was arrested by Israeli forces.

19 June 1996

At 1400 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim and Jarju' and areas along the Zahrani River came under Israeli artillery fire.

20 June 1996

At 1400 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area at medium altitudes.

At 1500 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Damur area at low altitudes.

At 1600 hours the hills to the south of Mashgharah and Ayn al-Tinah came under artillery fire from Israeli positions in the border strip.

At 1800 hours Israeli artillery fire was directed at the Mashgharah - Ayn al-Tinah road, the Ayn al-Hijlah locality and Mahniyah. Serious damage was done to the electricity network, and windows were broken in some homes.

24 June 1996

At 2045 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes.

At 2100 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and its neighbouring camps at low altitudes.

At 2145 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim and Jarju' and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

25 June 1996

At 1700 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim and Jarju' came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2030 hours the Iqilm al-Tuffah heights came under Israeli artillery fire. This was accompanied by low-altitude overflights of the Nabatiyah area by Israeli warplanes.

26 June 1996

At 1200 hours the outskirts of Majdal Zun came under Israeli artillery bombardment and bursts of fire from Israeli positions in the border strip.

At 1230 hours outlying areas of Jarju' and Arabsalim, areas along the Litani River and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

29 June 1996

At 0600 hours rockets began falling in the Hasbayya area.

At 0700 hours outlying areas of Libbaya in the western Bekaa came under Israeli artillery fire. The shelling affected the towns of Zillaya, Yuhmur, Maydun, Suhmur and Qilya and was accompanied by overflights of the western Bekaa area by Israeli warplanes. One unidentified person was killed in the shelling and three persons were injured, namely Haytham Isa, Ghalib Sarhal and Muhammad Qansu. Serious damage was also done to houses in Libbaya and Dallafah, and the Libbaya woodlands were set on fire.

At 0900 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim and Jarju', the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills and areas along the Zahrani River came under Israeli artillery fire. This was accompanied by low-altitude overflights by Israeli warplanes. The shelling affected the Humin al-Fawqa - Ayn Qana road, causing a number of crop fires in Ayn Qana.

30 June 1996

At 1000 hours a land-mine exploded in the Qati' locality of Mimis township in Rashayya district, seriously wounding Nimr Hammud Ma'lawi in the right leg.

At 1800 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim came under artillery bombardment and bursts of fire from Israeli positions in the border strip. A fire broke out and destroyed a 10-dunum area of marshland.

Israel's persistent refusal to implement Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and its continued occupation of Lebanese territory are perpetuating the cycle of violence and causing increased casualties among local inhabitants, particularly children and women. The Lebanese Government strongly condemns the continued Israeli occupation, the fresh attacks and the arbitrary practices inflicted on the Lebanese population, which have caused further deaths and injuries and have inflicted further serious damage to property.

Like previous attacks, this new series is in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and constitutes a breach of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of basic human rights.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/568
18 July 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 20 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the diplomatic note of the Secretary-General of 15 May 1996, requesting information on the implementation of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996 and the imposition of diplomatic and travel measures affecting the Government of the Sudan.

The Government of Canada informed the Government of the Sudan on 19 June 1996 that:

(a) The Government of the Sudan's representation in Canada will be frozen at the present low level of two diplomats;

(b) The movements in Canada of Sudanese Embassy personnel, without prior authority, will be limited to the National Capital region;

(c) The entry or transit of members, officials or military personnel of the Government of the Sudan into or through Canada will be denied or restricted;

(d) Representatives of Canadian Government departments or agencies will be enjoined not to organize or attend international conferences or meetings in the Sudan, with the exception of accredited diplomatic personnel.

The above measures will remain in effect until further notice.

96-18017 (E) 180796 190796

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/569
22 July 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the resolution on the dispute between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France that was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its sixty-fourth regular session, held from 1 to 5 July 1996, and endorsed by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government recently held in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed A. AZWAI
Permanent Representative

96-18371 (E) 230796 240796 250796

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Annex

[Original: English]

Resolution on the crisis between the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, as adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its sixty-fourth regular session, held in Yaoundé from 1 to 5 July 1996

The OAU Ministerial Council convened in its Sixty-Fourth Regular Session in Yaoundé, Cameroon, during the period 1 to 5 July 1996.

Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity which calls on member States to settle their differences by peaceful means, and the respect of the independence of all member States and refraining from threatening their territorial integrity and the security of their peoples,

Having discussed, with interest, the report of the Secretary-General on the new developments in the dispute between the Jamahiriya and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France,

Expressing its appreciation of the positive initiatives submitted by the Jamahiriya to solve the problem and its acceptance of Security Council resolution 731 (1992), under its national sovereignty and the norms of international law,

Expressing its deep concern over the continued escalation of the crisis and the threat to impose sanctions and the use of force against the Jamahiriya, which constitute a violation of the Charters of both the OAU and the United Nations and international conventions,

Taking into consideration the position of the Jamahiriya which condemns terrorism in all its forms and denounces those who resort to it or encourage it, and its readiness to cooperate with every regional or international effort to solve this problem,

Expressing its deep concern over the losses in lives and the material damage suffered by the Libyan Arab people and neighbouring peoples, as a result of the coercive measures applied in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993),

Recalling the statement issued by the OAU Five-Member Committee in its joint meeting with the Arab League's Seven-Member Committee in Cairo on 11 April 1996, calling for the coordination and unification of Arab and African efforts to reach a solution through dialogue and peaceful means, in conformity with the norms of international law and the respect of the State sovereignty and refraining from anything which might obstruct legal actions,

1. Expresses its deep concern over the losses in lives and the material damaged suffered by the Libyan Arab people as a result of the measures imposed on it under Security Council resolution 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) and states that non-response to moves and efforts made by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the OAU, the League of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, has greatly hurt the possibilities of reaching a solution for the crisis and increased the suffering of the Libyan Arab people and the neighbouring countries.

2. In the light of the cooperation existing between the League of Arab States and the OAU in this respect, sees that the proposal of the Arab League to hold a neutral and just trial for the two suspects before Scottish judges, under Scottish law in The Hague, with the necessary guarantees for the suspects, a proposal which has received wide international support, is a proper practical solution to end the crisis, that is why the three western countries are invited to consider that proposal.

3. Calls on the Security Council to lift the sanctions imposed on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, specially that continuation of these sanctions would prompt the African countries to consider the possible means of sparing the Libyan people more losses.

4. Supports the Jamahiriya in asking for proper compensation for the human losses and material and financial damage it suffered as a result of the application of the unjust embargo.

5. Pays tribute to the work of the OAU Five-Member Committee entrusted with the dispute and the statement issued by its joint meeting with the Arab League's Seven-Member Committee, and calls on it to continue its efforts to reach a just peaceful settlement of the dispute and report to the Council.

6. Requests the Secretary-General of the OAU to continue his efforts to lift the unjust embargo, and to submit a report of that matter to the next session.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/50/1003
S/1996/570
19 July 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 140
UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 16 July 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to request that you have the attached letter, dated 12 July 1996 (see annex), and its appendix, which were sent by Mr. Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada, the head of the Cuban delegation to the meetings of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), held on 26 and 27 June 1996, addressed to Mr. Assad Kotaite, President of the ICAO Council, as official documents of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 140, and of the Security Council.

The reference documents were given to the President of the ICAO Council in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted on 27 June 1996, by the ICAO Council, which requests Contracting States to inform the Council of any violation of the rules contained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

(Signed) Bruno RODRÍGUEZ PARRILLA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-18128 (E) 220796 220796 230796

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ANNEX

[Original: English and Spanish]

Letter dated 12 July 1996 from the head of the Cuban delegation to the meetings of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization, held in Montreal on 26 and 27 June 1996, addressed to the President of the Council

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted by the ICAO Council on 27 June 1996, which requests the contracting States to notify the Council of any violation of the rules set forth in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, I have the honour to inform you of the following.

On 2 July, I sent you a note dealing with our concern at what happened on 25 June 1996 at 9.24 a.m., when a United States Government aircraft flying within the Havana flight information region (Havana FIR), without due coordination, endangered the safety of air navigation in this region (see A/50/990-S/1996/520, annex).

Once again, on 11 July 1996 at 9.24 a.m., Cuba's radar system detected the flight of an unknown aircraft operating in the Havana FIR.

At 9.30 a.m., as is now usual, the Havana Air Traffic Control Centre (Havana ATC) sent a message to the Miami ATC, reporting the presence of said aircraft in Cuba's FIR and requesting information and cooperation to identify that flight. In its message, the Havana ATC provided the coordinates, speed, course, transponder code used by the unknown aircraft, and its origin. At 9.59 a.m., a reply was received from the Miami ATC indicating that it was a "United States Government aircraft operating at request in the area, with transponder code 5400".

Since the flight of the unknown aircraft belonging to the United States Government continued, at 11.36 a.m. the Havana ATC sent the Miami ATC a second message in which it reiterated that the aircraft, coming from the Miami FIR, was still flying perilously, without contacting the Havana ATC, crossing international corridors and coming dangerously near to three civilian aircraft in transit within the Havana FIR despite the actions taken by Cuba's Air Traffic Service. We reiterate our concern at these increased flights and the need for appropriate coordination of activities that pose a potential danger to civil aircraft operations.

At 9.33 a.m., a Boeing-737, of TACA International Airlines, Flight No. 370, en route from Belize to Miami, flight level 290, sighted a United States Government aircraft when both were some 25 nautical miles south of MAXIM.

A second Boeing-737, belonging to Líneas Aéreas Costarricenses (LACSA) Flight No. LRC-629, en route from Miami to Managua, at 10.39 a.m., came across a United States Government aircraft at flight level 290, less than five nautical miles away, on a position some 20 nautical miles south of TADPO.

The captain of LRC-629 reported sighting a DC-8 - or Boeing-707-type aircraft. At 10.54 a.m., a third Boeing-757-type aircraft belonging to the United States Challenger Air Cargo airline, Flight No. CWC-095, en route from Miami to Guayaquil, at flight level 302 feet, climbing to 330 feet, south of URSUS, came across a United States Government aircraft only five nautical miles away.

In view of this new incident, we believe that it is necessary to draw the attention of the ICAO Council to the danger posed by these flights to the safety of air navigation. In view of the increased frequency of these flights by United States Government aircraft within Cuba's FIR without due coordination, I reiterate the need to prevent an air disaster in the region.

We hope that ICAO will take the necessary measures to prevent further violations of the norms and regulations that have been enacted to ensure the orderly and safe flow of international air traffic.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the messages exchanged between the Havana ATC and the Miami ATC (see appendix).

(Signed) Ricardo ALARCÓN de QUESADA
Head of the Cuban delegation
to the meetings of the ICAO Council
held on 26 and 27 June 1996

APPENDIX

Note dated 12 July 1996 from the Vice-President of the Institute of Civil Aeronautics of Cuba to the Administrator of the United States Federal Aviation Authority

The aim of this note is to draw your attention to the dangerous flight carried out by a United States Government aircraft within the Havana FIR on 11 July 1996.

On 2 July 1996, I sent you a note in which I referred to our concern at what happened on 25 June 1996 at 9.24 a.m., when a United States Government aircraft flying within the Havana FIR, without due coordination, jeopardized air navigation in this region.

Once again, on 11 July 1996 at 9.24 a.m., Cuba's radar system detected the flight of an unknown aircraft operating in the Havana flight information region (HAVANA FIR).

At 9.30 hours, as is now usual, the Havana ATC sent a message to the Miami ATC, reporting the presence of said aircraft in the FIR and requesting information and cooperation to identify that flight. In its message, the Havana ATC provided the coordinates, speed, course, transponder code used by the unknown aircraft, and its origin. At 9.59 a.m., a reply from the Miami ATC was received indicating that it was a "United States Government aircraft operating at request in the area, with transponder code 5400".

Since the flight of the unknown aircraft belonging to the United States Government continued, at 11.36 a.m. the Havana ATC sent the Miami ATC a second message in which it reiterated that the aircraft, coming from the Miami FIR, was still flying perilously without contacting the Havana ATC, crossing international corridors and coming dangerously near to three civilian aircraft in transit within the Havana FIR despite the actions taken by Cuba's Air Traffic Service. We reiterate our concern at these increased flights and the need for appropriate coordination of activities that pose a potential danger to civil aircraft operations.

At 9.33 a.m., a Boeing-737, of TACA International Airlines on Flight No. 370 en route from Belize to Miami, flight level 290, sighted a United States Government aircraft when both were approximately 25 nautical miles south of MAXIM.

A second Boeing-737, belonging to Líneas Aéreas Costarricenses (LACSA), on the Flight No. LRC-629, en route from Miami to Managua, at 10.39 a.m., came across a United States Government aircraft at flight level 290, less than five nautical miles away, on a position approximately 20 nautical miles south of TADPO.

The captain of LRC-629 reported sighting a DC-8 - or Boeing-707-type aircraft. At 10.54 a.m., a third Boeing-757-type aircraft belonging to the United States Challenger Air Cargo airline, Flight No. CWC-095, en route from

Miami to Guayaquil, at flight level 302 feet, climbing to 330 feet, south of URSUS, came across a United States Government aircraft only five nautical miles away.

We hope that the necessary measures will be taken in view of the increased frequency of these flights by United States Government aircraft within Cuba's FIR without due coordination, and reiterate the need to prevent an air disaster in the region.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the messages exchanged between the Havana ATC and the MIAMI ATC (see attachment).

(Signed) Rogelio ACEVEDO GONZÁLEZ
Division General
President of the Institute of
Civil Aeronautics of Cuba

ATTACHMENT

Text of the exchange of messages between the Havana Air Traffic Control Centre and the Miami Air Traffic Control Centre on 11 July 1996

1. First message sent by the Havana ATC to the Miami ATC

At 1330 hours UTC, 11 July 1996, we detected an unknown aircraft in the vicinity of coordinates 2335 N/8425 W, speed 370 Kts, Fl 300, heading 090 degrees SSR, code 5400, apparently proceeding from your FIR.

Request please any available information on this flight. We appreciate your cooperation. Thanks.

2. Reply from the Miami ATC to the first message of the Havana ATC

United States Government aircraft operating due regard in this location, code 5400.

3. Second message sent by the Havana ATC to the Miami ATC a/

Since 1400 hours UTC, 11 July 1996, we have observed an unknown aircraft transponder code 1200, flight level 350, overflying TADPO.

Request any available information on this flight.

4. Reply sent by the Miami ATC to the second message of the Havana ATC

With reference to your phone and teletype inquiries on unknown aircraft, United States Government aircraft operating in warning area 174 C.

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a/ This message belongs to another aircraft using a VFR (visual flight regulations) code, apparently at high speed, which was seen when the aircraft with transponder code 5400 entered the area of TADPO.

5. Third message from the Havana ATC sent to the Miami ATC

Since 1330 UTC, an unknown aircraft entered into Havana FIR proceeding from Miami FIR without communication with Havana ACC. Flying from west to east and vice versa, crossing throughout international routes in Havana FIR at a flight level of 300 according to mode C. This flight until now has crossed the trajectory of several civilian aircraft in some cases there have been hazardous approaches. The first time was with LRC-629, 20 nautical miles south of TADPO, B727 KMIA/MNMG at a flight level of 290 with 5 nautical miles separation at 1439. The second was CWCO 95 30 nautical miles south of URSUS B757 KMIA/SEGU at a flight level of 302, climbing Fl 330 less than 5 nautical miles separation at 1554 UTC.

In response to our request, Miami ATC informed us that it was a Government aircraft operating due regard and they had not communication with it.

We are concerned about the increase of these flights that approach civilian aircraft.

It has become extremely necessary to coordinate these flights.

End.

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/50/1007
S/1996/571
19 July 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 55
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 19 July 1996 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to my letter dated 15 July 1996 (see A/50/999-S/1996/554), I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and of the flight information region of Nicosia by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, which were recorded today, 19 July 1996, as follows:

1. A formation of two Turkish Air Force aircraft along with one air-refuelling tanker entered at 0740 hours without permission the Nicosia flight information region. The aircraft exited the Nicosia flight information region at 1000 hours.

2. On the same day, another formation of four Turkish Air Force aircraft violated Cyprus airspace, entering at 0832 hours the flight information region of Nicosia and exited at 0858 hours.

3. In addition, four aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region at 0902 hours and exited at 0926 hours.

4. Finally, a formation of three aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region at 0940 hours and exited at 1006 hours.

The latest violations of the Nicosia flight information region and of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkish military aircraft took place on the eve of the twenty-second anniversary of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the occupation of 37 per cent of the island's territory.

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Such developments only heighten tension in Cyprus as it is also clearly stated in the latest Security Council resolution on Cyprus, 1062 (1996) of 28 June 1996.

At the same time, such unauthorized intrusions into the Nicosia flight information region are in violation of international air traffic rules and seriously endanger civil aviation flights over Cyprus.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I wish to strongly protest against these violations of the Nicosia flight information region and of the Republic's airspace by Turkish Air Force aircraft. The new violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus are in complete disregard of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant decisions of the Organization on the question of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kornelios S. KORNELIOU
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Cyprus to the
United Nations

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/572
19 July 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 JULY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NEW ZEALAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of New Zealand presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to inform him of measures taken by the New Zealand Government in conformity with paragraph 3 of resolution 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996.

The Sudan does not have diplomatic or consular representation in New Zealand, nor does New Zealand have diplomatic or consular representation in the Sudan. As a result, the first measure encompassed by resolution 1054 (1996) has no application for New Zealand.

As for the second measure encompassed by the resolution, restrictions on travel to or through New Zealand by members or officials of the Government of the Sudan, or of the Sudanese armed forces, have been implemented in New Zealand through existing immigration legislation.

96-18144 (E) 190796 200796

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/573
19 July 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JULY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THAILAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to the latter's note dated 15 May 1996, concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996, has the honour to inform him that Thailand has no diplomatic or consular representation in the Sudan, or vice versa. The Sudanese Ambassador residing in Kuala Lumpur is also accredited to Thailand. Consequently, there is no need for any action to be taken by the Royal Thai Government for the implementation of paragraph 3 (a) of the resolution.

The Permanent Representative of Thailand also has the honour to inform you that the Royal Thai Government has also instructed Thai authorities concerned to comply with paragraph 3 (b) of the resolution.

96-18162 (E) 190796 200796

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/574
19 July 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PARAGUAY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In compliance with resolution 1054 (1996), adopted by the Security Council at its 3660th meeting, held on 26 April 1996, I should like to inform you that the Government of Paraguay has no diplomatic or consular relations with the Sudan. None the less, it has taken the necessary steps to comply strictly with the provisions of that resolution.

(Signed) José Félix FERNÁNDEZ ESTIGARRIBIA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/575
20 July 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period from 22 January 1996 to 20 July 1996)

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1039 (1996) of 29 January 1996, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months, until 31 July 1996. It covers developments since my last report of 22 January 1996 (S/1996/45).

Situation in the area of operation

2. The reporting period was marked by an escalation of hostilities between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and its local Lebanese auxiliary, the de facto forces (DFF), on the one hand, and armed elements who have proclaimed their determination to resist the Israeli occupation on the other. The hostilities intensified in February and March 1996, and culminated in April in more than two weeks of heavy Israeli bombardments. The Security Council considered the situation and, on 18 April, adopted resolution 1052 (1996), calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties. On 10 May, the General Assembly also debated the matter and adopted resolution 50/22 C.

3. In their attacks against IDF/DFF, the armed elements employed small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles, as well as road-side bombs and rockets. Most of the attacks were carried out by the Islamic Resistance, the military wing of the Shiite Muslim Hizbullah organization. Others were carried out by the Shiite movement Amal and some by Palestinian factions. In responding to attacks or initiating operations, IDF/DFF employed automatic weapons, tanks, artillery, helicopter gunships, fixed-wing aircraft and naval vessels.

4. After a relatively calm period in January, hostilities in February and March were again at the level of previous reporting periods. UNIFIL recorded 24 operations by armed elements in February, 18 in March, and 6 in the first 10

days of April. On more than one occasion, notably on 16 February and 13 March, the Islamic Resistance conducted simultaneous attacks against a large number of IDF/DFF positions in the Israeli-controlled area (ICA). There were also numerous reports of operations north of the Litani river, bringing the total to more than 200 in the first three months of the mandate period. There was a significant development in March when the Islamic Resistance penetrated deep into the ICA to attack IDF and inflicted significant casualties. Thus, on 4 March, four Israeli soldiers were killed and nine others wounded by road-side bombs, when they were pursuing armed elements who had opened fire on a border patrol near Houle. On 10 March, one Israeli soldier was killed and four were wounded in a road-side bomb explosion near the village of Kafer Kela, across the border from Metulla. On 20 March, a suicide-bomber hurled himself at an Israeli convoy south of Taibe, killing an officer. IDF/DFF also suffered casualties in attacks north of the Litani river: on 14 March, eight Israeli soldiers were wounded on the road between Aichiyeh and Rihane in an ambush that involved road-side bombs, mortars and small arms fire.

5. The ability of the Islamic Resistance to penetrate deep inside the ICA and to inflict casualties on IDF triggered a public debate in Israel, the thrust of which was that IDF must respond forcefully and should no longer be bound by constraints imposed on it. Those constraints were connected with an agreement reportedly arranged by the United States of America in the summer of 1993. The United Nations has not been informed of this agreement, although it has been publicly mentioned by Israeli and Hizbullah officials. Based on such public statements it would appear that the Islamic Resistance agreed to refrain from targeting villages and towns in northern Israel, while IDF agreed to refrain from doing the same in Lebanon; there has been no mention of limitations concerning attacks on military targets. Indications in Israel that the agreed restrictions were no longer acceptable and that a large-scale operation against the Islamic Resistance was being contemplated heightened tension in the area. On 15 March, the Force Commander of UNIFIL conveyed his concern to the Israeli authorities.

6. Tension remained high and rose again when, on 30 March, two men working on a water tower in Yatar were killed and one was injured by a missile fired by IDF. In response, the Islamic Resistance fired more than 20 rockets to Israel, causing minor damage. The Israeli Government declared that the firing of the missile at Yatar had been a mistake. On 8 April, a boy was killed and three others were wounded in an explosion near Brashit. Hizbullah claimed to have collected evidence that IDF had planted the explosives. The Israeli authorities, for their part, denied any involvement and suggested that the explosions had been caused by old mines. UNIFIL investigated the explosion and found that it had been caused by four serially connected and booby-trapped road-side bombs; UNIFIL could not determine who had placed them. The day following the explosion, the Islamic Resistance fired almost 30 rockets towards northern Israel. Some of these impacted at Qiryat Shemona, injuring a number of civilians and causing damage. In retaliation, Israeli aircraft dropped nine bombs on the Majdal Silm-Sultaniyeh area, and Israeli artillery fired some 250 rounds artillery towards the same area.

7. IDF/DFF initiated attacks and carried out retaliatory firing against armed elements. Altogether, UNIFIL recorded some 10,000 artillery, mortar and tank

rounds fired by IDF/DFF before 11 April. Israeli aircraft continued to overfly Lebanese territory, including Beirut.

8. The Israeli navy patrolled Lebanese territorial waters and imposed restrictions on the local fishermen around Tyre. Occasionally, it fired at or near fishing boats and temporarily detained the fishermen. UNIFIL intervened with the Israeli authorities repeatedly for the release of those detained.

9. As before, UNIFIL continued its efforts to limit the conflict and to protect the inhabitants from the fighting. Through its network of checkpoints and observation posts and an active programme of patrolling, the Force did its best to prevent its area of deployment from being used for hostile activities and to defuse situations that could lead to escalation. It also deployed as necessary to provide a measure of protection to the villages and to farmers working in the fields. As before, Lebanese villagers sought refuge in UNIFIL positions when there was shelling.

10. In the early morning of 11 April, Israeli aircraft and artillery began an intensive bombardment of southern Lebanon as well as targets in the Beirut area and in the Bekaa Valley. The declared objective of these attacks was to put pressure on the Government of Lebanon so that it would curb the activities of the Islamic Resistance.

11. About two hours after the attacks started on 11 April, the Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major General Stanislaw Woźniak, received a telephone call from the chief of IDF liaison, who warned UNIFIL of the attacks. General Woźniak protested the attacks and stated that UNIFIL would: endeavour to prevent any IDF incursion into its area of operation; do all it could to protect civilians and expect IDF to do the same; and insist on complete access to its area of operation through IDF-controlled gates. General Woźniak reiterated his strong protest in a meeting with the Israeli liaison chief the next day.

12. In the first few days of the operation, Israeli air force and artillery attacked selected targets, including the homes of persons suspected to be affiliated with Hizbullah. At the same time, an IDF-controlled radio station in southern Lebanon broadcast threats of further bombardments, set deadlines for the inhabitants to leave and stated that once the deadline had passed IDF would regard all who remained as legitimate targets. By 13 April, some 90 towns and villages, including Tyre and villages north of the Litani river, had thus been placed under threat. As a result of these threats and the Israeli bombardment, about a quarter of the inhabitants, more than 100,000, left UNIFIL's area of operation and Tyre. Around 5,000 persons sought refuge inside UNIFIL positions and at its logistic base in Tyre.

13. Given the large number of inhabitants who remained behind, IDF did not in fact treat the whole area as a free-fire zone. Once it had run out of targets, it conducted, with great fire power, attacks on sources of firing and other targets of opportunity, as well as pre-emptive bombardment of locations from which attacks were known to have been launched in the past.

14. At the same time, IDF carried out limited attacks in the Beirut area, which followed no apparent military rationale but raised fears, heightened by remarks

attributed to Israeli officials, that Lebanon's overall economic recovery was being threatened. In addition, the Israeli navy blockaded the Lebanese ports and shelled the coastal road north of Saida, seriously disrupting communications between the capital and the south.

15. In the last few days of the operation, the Israeli forces targeted the main roads in southern Lebanon using heavy bombs dropped by aircraft.

16. Altogether, UNIFIL counted in its area of operation more than 600 Israeli air raids, involving both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, which used over 1,500 bombs or rockets. Israeli artillery fired some 25,000 shells, in particular in the sectors of the Fijian, Nepalese, Irish and Ghanaian battalions as well as to the area north of the Litani river opposite the Finnish battalion sector. IDF also used long-range patrols which moved forward of the ICA and, in two places, which were later notified to UNIFIL, planted mines and booby-traps. The Norwegian battalion sector, which is entirely within the ICA, remained calm.

17. Throughout the Israeli bombardment, the Islamic Resistance fired some 1,100 rockets from the UNIFIL area. Many fell short; an estimated 600 landed in northern Israel. Some of the rockets impacted in villages and towns, causing injuries to civilians as well as damage. In areas within range of the rockets, many of the inhabitants left their homes and others were evacuated. On 14 April, a rocket fell inside the UNIFIL headquarters compound at Naqoura, causing minor damage.

18. In UNIFIL's area of deployment more than 120 civilians were killed by Israeli fire and an estimated 500 were wounded. Most of these casualties occurred on 18 April as a result of the shelling of a United Nations compound at Qana, in which more than 100 Lebanese were killed and many more wounded. This incident has been the subject of an investigation by my Military Adviser, whose report I conveyed to the Security Council on 7 May (S/1996/337). In the whole of the UNIFIL area at least 450 houses were damaged or destroyed and many roads were made impassable by bombs. The supply of water and electricity was disrupted.

19. By a letter, dated 23 May 1996, from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the Government of Lebanon provided a detailed account of Israeli attacks on Lebanon that took place during April 1996 (A/50/561-S/1996/380).

20. UNIFIL continued to do its best to protect the civilian population from the violence and to provide humanitarian assistance. Because of the mounting tension, UNIFIL had already reinforced its positions close to the line of confrontation, and increased patrolling. When the bombardment began, the Force strengthened these measures and cancelled all leave. Isolated Lebanese army positions inside the UNIFIL area were taken under protection. Despite the Israeli bombardment and harassment by both sides, UNIFIL continued to patrol its area actively. The Force provided shelter, food, medical assistance and other services to the civilians who had sought protection at its positions and camps. The Force also organized convoys for those villagers who wished to leave their homes and brought supplies to those who chose to remain but had run out of food

and water. UNIFIL teams visited the villages and distributed food and other relief supplies, and searched for persons trapped in damaged buildings.

21. UNIFIL's efforts were severely hindered by the sustained bombardment. UNIFIL trucks and armoured personnel carriers, which were engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the population, were often delayed or stopped altogether as a result of firing by Israeli artillery and aircraft, despite assurances from IDF that all UNIFIL humanitarian missions would be facilitated. In the later stages of the Israeli operation, the damage to roads impeded UNIFIL movements.

22. In addition, the positions and vehicles of the Force came frequently under fire. There were some 270 instances of firings at or close to UNIFIL positions, of which about 15 were caused by the Islamic Resistance and the remainder by IDF/DFF. A Fijian officer and two Nepalese soldiers were injured by Islamic Resistance elements in response to the Force's attempts to prevent the latter from launching rockets from the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. Direct hits from Israeli artillery caused serious injuries to four Fijian soldiers, as well as considerable damage to UNIFIL positions and vehicles. All firings were protested to the authorities concerned.

23. In the aftermath of the Qana incident, UNIFIL has sought and received a commitment from IDF that it will respect a safety zone around UNIFIL positions. UNIFIL has also received assurances from the Islamic Resistance, through the Lebanese Army, that they will not conduct operations in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions.

24. The hostilities ended on 27 April, when a partial cease-fire went into effect, following diplomatic efforts by France and the United States of America. The partial cease-fire is in the form of an understanding, which was announced simultaneously in Beirut and Jerusalem. According to the published text of the understanding, armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by any kind of weapon into Israel, and Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind of weapon at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon. Furthermore, the two parties will ensure that under no circumstances will civilians be the target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks. It is stated that, without violating the understanding, nothing therein shall preclude any party from exercising the right of self-defence. The understanding provides for the establishment of a monitoring group consisting of the United States, France, the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon and Israel and of a consultative group, to consist of France, the European Union, the Russian Federation and other interested parties for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction of Lebanon.

25. On 16 July, the Secretariat was briefed about the monitoring group by representatives of France and the United States. The Secretariat was informed that the chair of the group would be based in Cyprus while its military experts would meet in Naqoura. The two representatives requested that UNIFIL provide facilities for the latter meetings.

26. After the partial cease-fire went into effect, there was a brief lull in activities with only five operations observed by UNIFIL in May. There were 11

operations in June and 5 in the first half of July. Nearly all were carried out by the Islamic Resistance. There were also reports of over 40 operations north of the Litani river. Again, some of these attacks were well inside the ICA and there was a high number of Israeli casualties (8 killed and more than 20 wounded). This contributed to a continuing high level of tension. On 30 May, two staggered road-side bombs killed four Israeli soldiers and injured several others at Marjayoun, where IDF/DFF have their headquarters in southern Lebanon. On 10 June, all 13 members of an Israeli patrol north of the Litani river were killed or wounded in an ambush by the Islamic Resistance. In retaliatory fire after the 10 June incident, Israeli artillery killed one Lebanese Army soldier and wounded one civilian. On 14 June, a roadside bomb exploded in Houle, killing three children. In sum, while the number of operations has gone down, the number of casualties has remained high.

27. In view of the seriousness of the events in southern Lebanon, I asked the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, to travel to the region to consult with Governments prior to the expiry of UNIFIL's mandate. Mr. Annan visited the region from 26 June to 4 July 1996 and met with senior officials in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel. He also met with the Force Commander of UNIFIL and his staff and visited the Fijian battalion headquarters at Qana and other locations in the UNIFIL area of deployment.

Humanitarian activities

28. UNIFIL continued to extend humanitarian assistance in the form of harvest escorts, medical care, engineering works and the distribution of educational material and equipment provided by UNICEF. Medical teams treated more than 2,000 patients each month at UNIFIL medical aid posts and mobile clinics. Some humanitarian projects were funded by troop-contributing Governments.

29. In connection with the Israeli bombardment in April, the Government of Lebanon requested the United Nations to issue an international appeal to meet the urgent humanitarian needs resulting from the hostilities. Through the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Beirut, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs assisted the authorities in mobilizing international support and coordinating the response of the United Nations system. A "flash appeal", launched on 20 April, sought to mobilize US$ 8.6 million to address the needs of 20,000 most affected families. The overall response was positive: some $14 million was committed by donors.

30. UNIFIL played an important role in handling the relief stores of other organizations. During the April hostilities the major portion of the relief supplies and medical equipment provided to southern Lebanon flowed through the UNIFIL base at Tyre to the units in the field, which distributed them. In addition, during and after the fighting, UNIFIL supported the operations of several United Nations agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and provided assistance to local and international non-governmental organizations. In addition, UNIFIL repaired roads destroyed in the bombardment to the extent possible with the modest means at its disposal.

31. UNIFIL continued the disposal of unexploded artillery shells and aerial bombs in its area of operations. Two small mine fields, which IDF had planted in the UNIFIL area of deployment, were cleared in May, on the basis of information provided by IDF. In all, 243 controlled explosions were carried out.

Organizational matters

32. As of July 1996, UNIFIL comprised 4,483 troops, from Fiji (579), Finland (491), France (247), Ghana (644), Ireland (625), Italy (45), Nepal (600), Norway (615) and Poland (637). The replacement of the Norwegian Maintenance Company by a Polish unit was effected in May 1996. UNIFIL was assisted in the performance of its tasks by 57 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. In addition, UNIFIL employed 561 civilian staff, of whom 123 were recruited internationally and 438 locally. The deployment of UNIFIL is shown on the annexed map. Major-General Stanislaw F. Woźniak of Poland continued as Force Commander.

33. The streamlining of UNIFIL, mentioned in previous reports, was completed in May 1996. UNIFIL will continue its efforts to achieve further economies in the area of administrative and support services.

34. I regret to report the death of two Ghanaian soldiers from natural causes. Five Fijian and two Nepalese soldiers were wounded as a result of firing. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 207 members of the Force have died: 76 as a result of firing or bomb explosions, 84 in accidents and 47 from other causes. A total of 324 have been wounded by firing or by mine or bomb explosions.

35. The problem of the rents owed by the Lebanese Government to the owners of the land and premises used by UNIFIL has still not been resolved. Not all owners have received payment and there is continuing controversy over the lists of owners prepared by the Lebanese authorities. Some owners have requested that their properties be vacated. For practical and budgetary reasons, only some of these requests can be met.

36. UNIFIL maintained close contacts with the Lebanese authorities on matters of mutual concern. Those authorities provided valuable assistance in connection with the rotation of troops and logistic activities in Beirut. The Lebanese army was helpful in defusing confrontations with armed elements. It also provided accommodation for some UNIFIL contingents while on leave in Lebanon. The force continued to cooperate with the Lebanese Internal Security Forces on matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order.

37. It will be recalled that since 18 April 1995, two Palestinians have been accommodated at UNIFIL headquarters, after being deported to Lebanon by the Israeli authorities and denied entry by the Lebanese authorities. On 28 February 1996, one of them was allowed to leave for Jordan. Contacts continue to find a solution for the other.

Financial aspects

38. By its resolution 50/89 B of 7 June 1996, the General Assembly appropriated to the Special Account for UNIFIL an amount of $125,722,800 gross for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, based on an average strength of 4,513 troops and a continuation of its existing responsibilities. The assessment of the appropriation, which is equivalent to $10,476,900 gross per month, is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 31 July 1996.

39. As of 30 June 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account amounted to $201.9 million. The total unpaid assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations at that date amounted to $2.7 billion.

Observations

40. The last six months were marked by the serious escalation of hostilities in April, of which the population of southern Lebanon was the primary victim. UNIFIL, too, came under fire. It is a matter of regret that the United Nations once again has cause to call upon the parties concerned to respect the non-combatant status of civilians and United Nations peace-keepers.

41. On 29 January, in extending UNIFIL's mandate, the Security Council *inter alia* reiterated that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolution 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force contained in the then Secretary-General's report of 19 March 1978 (S/12611); and called upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate. As in the past, such cooperation has not been forthcoming and there has been no active political pressure on the parties to implement resolution 425 (1978). In recent years, the best hope for the implementation of that mandate has been through the negotiating process within the framework established at the Madrid conference in October 1991. That process, however, appears to have made no progress towards the attainment of the Security Council's objectives concerning southern Lebanon.

42. This leaves UNIFIL in the same difficult and dangerous situation in which it has been since the Israeli forces withdrew to their present lines in 1985. At the time, my predecessor wrote: "UNIFIL is now stationed in an area where active resistance against IDF is in progress, and in which the latter is engaged in active countermeasures. UNIFIL, for obvious reasons, has no right to impede Lebanese acts of resistance against the occupying force, nor does it have the mandate or the means to prevent countermeasures" (S/17093, para. 24). In the circumstances, UNIFIL has done its best to limit violence and to protect the civilian population. This has become its de facto mandate. In pursuing it, the Force has in fact impeded both sides from pursuing their military aims in the conflict, but only to the extent that the parties have permitted it to do so, out of a presumed desire to avoid escalation. As a peace-keeping force, it is powerless when either party is bent on confrontation.

43. In this connection, I note that the understanding announced on 26 April 1996 has the potential of contributing to the protection of civilians and restraining the parties. It is therefore to be hoped that it will soon be put into full effect. I have instructed UNIFIL to assist the monitoring group, which is currently being set up in accordance with the understanding. I believe this is consistent with the Security Council's objectives and would meet with its approval.

44. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations has outlined his Government's position on the situation in the area in a letter he addressed to me on 18 July 1996 (S/1996/566). He also informed me of his Government's decision to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months.

45. In similar circumstances in the past, I have recommended that UNIFIL's mandate be extended in view of the importance of its contribution to stability and the measure of protection it is able to afford to the civilian population. Notwithstanding the events of last April, these considerations are, I believe, still valid, bearing in mind the likely effect in the area if UNIFIL were to be withdrawn in present circumstances. I therefore recommend that the Security Council accept the Lebanese Government's request and extend the mandate of UNIFIL at its present strength for another period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1997. In making this recommendation, I have especially in mind UNIFIL's role in shielding the civilian population from the worst effects of the violence. The Force's work in this regard during the April escalation has underscored the importance of this function.

46. I must again draw attention to the serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to some $201.9 million. This represents money owed to Member States that contribute the troops who make up the Force. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to the Force, in particular those of developing countries, for their understanding and patience in these difficult circumstances.

47. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major-General Stanislaw F. Woźniak, the Force Commander, and to the men and women under his command for the manner in which they have carried out their difficult and often dangerous tasks, in particular during the hostilities in April. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.


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في تموز/يوليه ١٩٩٦
1996年7月联黎部队的部署情形
UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JULY 1996
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL EN JULLIET 1996
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
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检查站
Check point
Point de controle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب
قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des differents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Limites entre batallones de la Fuerza
حدود مناطق عمليات
قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte
وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unite libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa
موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو «جيش جنوب لبنان»
以色列国防军和(或)"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de defense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Libano meridional"
الامتداد الشمالي للمنطقة التي تسيطر عليها إسرائيل
以色列控制地区向北延伸部分
Northward extension of Israeli controlled area
Extension vers le nord de la zone contrôlée par Israel
Северная часть территории, контролируемой Израилем
Extensión septentrional de la zona controlada por Israel
المساحة التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية من منطقة عمل قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况
Approximate area under Israeli control in UNIFIL area of operation
Périmètre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israelien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL
Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля
Area aproximada bajo control israeli dentro de la zone de operaciones de la Fuerza

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LETTER DATED 22 JULY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

It is a step forward, but to quote Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, "it is not enough". It is positive to remove Karadzic from the post of SDS leadership as is called for by the Dayton/Paris Accords. Unfortunately, this does not satisfy the demands of either the International War Crimes Tribunal, the Security Council, or the Dayton/Paris Accords which call for full cooperation with the Tribunal and for the arrest and extradition to The Hague of indicted war criminals. We fully agree with Ambassador Holbrooke's opinion and join in his call for full compliance.

In the effort to remove Radovan Karadzic from SDS leadership, we trust that no deals have been made that would marginalize efforts to compel compliance with the Tribunal's demand for the arrest and extradition of Mladic or of other indicted war criminals as well. If there is a deal, we, as a signatory of the Dayton/Paris Accords, as well as the Tribunal and the Security Council, have a right to know the details. The Security Council must now press ahead with full compliance, including pressing forth with sanctions with respect to the non-compliant.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
Special Envoy

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